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Review

Old habits die hard: Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO) propensity for military confrontation against its professed embracement of peaceful conflict resolution, 1976 to 2017

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This article reviews Tavuyanago's publication entitled Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO): from military confrontation to peaceful engagement, 1976 to 2009'. In this article, Tavuyanago gave much credit to Renamo for the creation of democratic space in Mozambique's post-civil war political landscape. RENAMO had waged a brutal guerrilla war against Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in the period from 1976 to 1992 when a peace accord was signed between the belligerents. Subsequently, RENAMO participated in the 1994 general elections in Mozambique and accepted the outcome of the poll. In this context, Tavuyanago concluded that RENAMO would never go back to the bush to fight against the government; a prediction which was proved wrong by historical events when RENAMO withdrew from the government and declared war on FRELIMO. Indeed, this proved that old habits die hard as RENAMO resorted to war as a tool to gain political concessions from the ruling FRELIMO government. In the final analysis, the paper argues that Tavuyanago was too judgmental to argue that RENAMO would not return to war.

Key words: Conflict, democracy, election, Frelimo, Renamo, Mozambique, war.

INTRODUCTION

Independent Southern African states such as Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe that achieved independence through the armed struggle have had their share of hotly contested elections. The contest has largely been between and amongst political parties that were involved in the armed struggle to liberate their respective countries.¹

The electoral contest had largely involved political parties that played a critical role in the liberation of their

respective countries. The main dichotomies amongst these former liberation movements emanated from divergent ideological orientations, irreconcilable personality differences among the leaders and the general quest for self-aggrandizement. In the case of Mozambique, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was pitted against the Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO) after the country's attainment of independence in 1975.

The Mozambican scenario is unique in that while FRELIMO waged the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial rule, RENAMO was a movement that

¹ See the Zimbabwe African National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union in the case of Zimbabwe and MPLA and UNITA in the case of Angola.

emerged in the country in the post independence era. RENAMO was a creation of the white minority government in Rhodesia which was indirectly fighting against FRELIMO towards the close of the Mozambican war of independence. It was initially widely cast as a bandit movement that lacked features of other successful insurgency movements such as a well-defined guiding ideology, charismatic leadership and a clear political programme (Hall, 1999).

After about 15 years of a protracted brutal war against the FRELIMO-led government, RENAMO however managed to transform itself into a mass political party that actively and persistently participated in the country's electoral processes from 1994 onwards. RENAMO's dark history (which involved brutalising the masses, forcing youngsters to join its ranks, kidnapping opponents and plundering state resources), its metamorphosis into a supposedly democratic party and its subsequent contribution to Mozambique's nascent democracy was the foci of Tavuyanago (2011) article in the *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations: 'RENAMO: from military confrontation to peaceful democratic engagement, 1976 to 2009'*. This article endeavours to review the above article and, especially in view of the post-2009 developments that have seen RENAMO receding to its old habits of using military confrontation as a weapon of confronting its erstwhile FRELIMO rival.

Summary of the article

Using mainly secondary sources, Tavuyanago (2011) article examines the birth of RENAMO in 1976 as a mercenary movement created and sponsored by the Rhodesian government to destabilise the newly independent state of Mozambique. It also explores the movement's broad aims, its tainted history in the Mozambican civil war of 1976 to 1990 and its mutation from a rebel movement to a fully-fledged political party.

Further, the article analyses the movement's subsequent contribution to Mozambique's budding democracy from 1990 to 2009 (Minter, 1999). The author's central argument was that in spite of its murky history of being a vicious bush guerrilla army, RENAMO was over time able to transform itself into a respectable and credible political party which consistently participated in Mozambique's electoral processes between 1994 and 2009. During this period, the movement acquitted itself well on the country's political landscape when it managed to win in some of the provinces such as Niassa, Nampula, Zambezia, Tete, Manica and Sofala.

Consequently, Tavuyanago (2011) argues that the

RENAMO movement contributed to Mozambique's peaceful transition from war to peace and in the establishment, together with FRELIMO of a democratic culture of electoral contest in the country. This was in spite of the contestations which characterised each election since 1994. It was the author's contention therefore that overall, RENAMO's contribution to conflict management in the country and to the deepening and consolidation of democracy in Mozambique was great (Tavuyanago, 2011). It was in that vein that Giovanni (2005) affirmed that the movement became a major instrument in channelling peaceful management of conflicts in Mozambique. The paper however notes RENAMO's limitations which, among others, included deliberate frustrations by the FRELIMO government to its contribution to national development for fear it would steal the show, its inexperience in governance and Afonso Dhlakama's "personalistic and extra-parliamentary leadership style (Tavuyanago, 2011) worked down on the efforts his party representatives were putting into their parliamentary duties.

Tavuyanago (2011) conclusion was that notwithstanding its spiteful past and heavily dented history, RENAMO managed to re-brand itself into a new political outfit which moved away from the use of military force in resolving domestic conflicts. As a result, the movement was able to attract a large following which subsequently legitimised it. It is again the author's view that RENAMO thus managed to deliver peace and safeguard multi-party democracy in the country for the period up to 2009 (Tavuyanago, 2011). Its participation in Mozambique's burgeoning democracy, without doubt, led to the establishment of relative peace and stability in the country and the promotion of a competitive political climate, itself a sign of democracy. The period between 1990 and 2009 was therefore characterised by the general absence of open military confrontation and a desire to cooperate with its erstwhile FRELIMO opponent.

RENAMO's 2012 disengagement from government and its subsequent retreat to its Gorogossa hideout was certainly a sign that 'old habits die hard'. This review will deliberate on the implications of the movement's new tactics of using military force as a bargaining tool to, once again, 'democratise' Mozambique's political space. The review will however caution that while indeed Dhlakama (the leader of RENAMO) has gone back to the bush, this is only but some bellicose grandiloquence directed at forcing the government to return to the democratic path of full-scale engagement and accommodation. This review will thus aver that currently RENAMO has no capacity to fight a sustained war with the FRELIMO government because of the changed geopolitics of the region which does not condone banditry. Given that scenario, the

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review argues that the movement will find it difficult to solicit for regional military backing. Resultantly its threats will remain mere combative rhetoric.

A critique of the article

While the article brings about some new insights in the understanding of the contradictions shrouding the RENAMO movement during its lifespan, it is totally silent on the methodology employed in synthesising the collected information. Indeed, while it is evident that the article is grounded on secondary sources, this review goes further to interrogate the data collected through oral interviews conducted along and across the south-eastern border area of the country by one of the reviewers between 2015 and 2017.

Overall, the study employs qualitative research techniques to collect, collate and synthesise data. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with displaced Mozambicans currently living in Zimbabwe and across the border. Document analysis involved the study of secondary sources of information such as published books, journal articles and electronic media sources. The information from the interviews certainly added a new dimension to the RENAMO story and without doubt injected fresh insights in understanding the movement, especially since the 'rebel' group's return to its Gorongossa wartime base in 2012 invariably to start another war.

Again, Tavuyanago loosely uses the term 'democracy' throughout his treatise without giving due consideration to its deep meaning. Democracy comes from the Greek word *demo*-people and *cratos*-power (Bhebe and Ranger, 2001). Abraham Lincoln succinctly defined it as a government of the people by the people for the people (Hlongwana and Makanyisa, 2011). It therefore means people's power where government derives its sovereignty from the people. Its main tenets include free and regular elections, transparency, rule of law, political tolerance and political pluralism. While after 1992 RENAMO embraced democratic practices of contesting in elections, the assertion that RENAMO contributed to peace and democracy in Mozambique cannot be taken at face value. It was in effect RENAMO which destroyed peace in Mozambique during the 15 years from 1976 while fighting in the corner of regional and global agents of imperialism. While it is a progressive gesture to acknowledge RENAMO's participation in democratic processes in Mozambique it is equally disingenuous to associate the movement with total engagement with democracy. Democrats do not unleash wars but get into office through democratic means, a credo that RENAMO failed to live by at all times.

Moreover, the author overlooked the contribution of transnational processes and events to the rise of Mozambican democracy. What needs to be emphasised is that the end of bi-polar politics in the 1990s following the

collapse of the Cold War and the subsequent rise of the United States' unilateralism whipped African Marxist states such as Mozambique into adopting the Western liberal democratic culture (Manning, 1998). Thus, RENAMO participated in democratic processes in Mozambique not as a willing contributor but an opportunist who had no option but to embrace the dictates of a new global ideology, and certainly sing for its supper.

The origins of the RENAMO movement are well articulated in the article through a thorough dissection of two contrasting schools (Tungamirai, 1987; Hanlon, 1984; Ellert, 1993; Flower, 1987). While the first school argues that RENAMO was an imperialist stooge created and sustained by external support (Rhodesian, South African and Western), the 'revisionist' paradigm countered that the group was a "genuine popular movement" fighting a "bona fide civil war" (Tavuyanago, 2011). What was undeniable was that it indeed started as a counter-insurgency movement that grew into a formidable political party because of its ability to study, understand and take full advantage of the grievances of the rural electorate of the country.

Concomitant with the aforementioned argument, this article discusses both the declared and perceived aims of the movement in fairly great detail. However missing from this part of the discussion is how the Ndaou-Tshonga ethnic rivalry became embroiled in the RENAMO-FRELIMO conflict matrix. The Tshonga southerners who happened to dominate FRELIMO politics blamed the Ndaou for practising witchcraft and for being mentally incorrigible while on the other hand the Ndaou accused the southerners of displaying disdainful attitude towards them (Chingono, 1996). The Ndaou, appeared to have had a case as provinces north of the Save River had not been part of the top FRELIMO leadership. To this extent the first three leaders of FRELIMO, two of whom became state Presidents of the Republic of Mozambique, all came from the south: Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane (Inhambane), Samora Moises Machel (Gaza) and Joaquim Alberto Chissano (Gaza) (Chisiwa, 2017). Undeniably, southerners tend to have an upper hand over other ethnic formations because they benefited more from the Portuguese colonial system (Sumich, 2005).

In addition, the Ndaou blamed Samora Machel and his compatriots from the south for hijacking the revolution from a deserving Ndaou, Urias Simango, who according to the FRELIMO's hierarchical structure should have ascended to the presidency of the party following Mondlane's assassination in 1969 (Chikava, 2010). However, the Ndaou allege that Simango was falsely accused of complicity in the murder of his leader and subsequently expelled from FRELIMO (Chitiki, 2016). As if the expulsion was not enough Simango was arrested in 1974 and secretly executed together with his wife on the orders of the Mozambican government in 1977. It is, thus, undeniable that the expulsion and the subsequent elimination of Simango drove a wedge between the Ndaou and the Tshonga and by extension, between RENAMO

Table 1. RENAMO election results between 1994 and 2014.

Election	Votes	Percentage (%)	Seats
2014	1 495 137	32.46	89
2009	688 782	17.69	51
2004	905 289	29.73	90
1999	1 603 811	38.81	117
1994	1 803 506	37.78	112

Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RENAMO>.

and FRELIMO during the period of confrontation (Cahen, 1999).

Again, this review emphasises that in order to gain domestic and international sympathy, Dhlakama and RENAMO portrayed themselves as nationalists who were fighting to liberate Mozambicans from communist domination and oppression. RENAMO also blamed the Mozambican Government for excluding other groups in governance and for pursuing policies that were ethnically biased. It, therefore, argued for proportional representation in government, the holding of regular, free and fair elections and the abandonment of a command economy (Young, 1989) On the prosecution of the war, RENAMO furthermore exploited the people's underlying grievances. They certainly had grievances against the FRELIMO government, considered generally insensitive to the needs especially of the rural population. Chingono (1996) argued that FRELIMO's miscalculations contributed to the outbreak and progression of the civil war.

In support of the RENAMO party were some traditional chiefs who had been aggrieved by the FRELIMO-led government after being forced to relinquish their authority to government-appointed officials who in many cases were not familiar with local customs (Morgan, 1990). Furthermore, the creation of *aldeia comunais* state initiated villages alienated FRELIMO from the ordinary man in Mozambique. Broadly, many people were less willing to leave their traditional homes for the *aldeia comunais* (Dinerman, 1994). Perreira (1999) argues that FRELIMO adopted the villagisation programme as a ploy to exercise political control over the people rather than a means of initiating an agricultural revolution through collective agricultural production (Perreira, 1999).

However, Lorgen (1999) contends that the government set up communal villages in order to manage the redistribution of scarce resources and services to the peasants. However, Samora Machel who wanted to please his communist handlers such as China and Russia adopted socialism as a guiding ideology. However, the result was chaos in the country's economy (Daniel, 2016). The new currency (*meticais*) which replaced the Portuguese Escudos) in 1975 was rendered valueless by hyper-inflation while commodities disappeared from government-owned shops commonly known as *loja do*

povo. Mozambican Ndau resorted to crossing the border to Rhodesia to get basic commodities as the country's populist policies had destroyed the economy.

Also, RENAMO capitalised on FRELIMO's attitude on religion and tradition (Morgan, 1990). FRELIMO's determination to oppose all types of religion, age old practices such as polygamy was motivated by the desire to modernise "backward looking" Mozambicans and to get rid of practices and institutions that were closely associated with the Portuguese colonial Government (Morgan, 1990). It is important however to note that some other post-independence policies were meant to effect positive transformation. Among others, were the government's efforts to force people to use toilets, to stop wearing a traditional mini skirt popularly known among the Ndau as *Chichakati/girigidera* for moral reasons and its opposition to alcoholism, which, however, found little purchase among the Ndau (Mafika, 2017).

President Machel became unpopular among Ndau men who could not stomach attempts to ban the consumption of home-brewed beers notably *kachasu/nipa*, *chikeke* and others (Mutukweni, 2017). In spite of the allegation that such beers were a danger to health and sexual fertility the local population had no substitutes as the commercially brewed beers such as *vinho* and *cerveja* were expensive to buy. Women on the other hand argued that *girigidera* unlike other dress apparels enhanced their beauty in the eyes of men. While the above policies were intended to transform the Mozambican society, some commentators suggest that such policies should have been gradually introduced to prevent a backlash from tradition (Muzondi, 2016).

The discussion on RENAMO's participation in the presidential, parliamentary and local government elections between 1994 and 2009 was fairly elaborate. Conclusions so arrived at were RENAMO's performance remained constant except in the 2009 general election where there was a noticeable decline in its support base. There was again a noticeable increase in the number of its voters in the 2014 poll as reflected in Table 1. What was however evident in all the elections was the existence of relative peace and tranquillity, a plus to the country's emerging democracy.

Postscript: The resurgence of conflict since 2012

Up until 2012, it appeared that the domestic framework then established had been a rare case of post-war success: violence receded and general elections as demanded by the country's constitution were held regularly. Mozambique also seemed to have a promising economic future lying ahead. However, this air of optimism dissipated when RENAMO returned to the bush and declared war on the Mozambican government in 2012. Ironically, the resurgence of conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO was contrary to Tavuyanago (2011) earlier

conclusion that RENAMO would not return to war. Accordingly explanations have been forwarded to justify the escalation of conflict between FRELIMO and RENAMO. The latter continued to accuse the former of running a warped political and economic system which disadvantaged people outside FRELIMO structures. Dhlakama, argues that FRELIMO's political and economic governance strategy since the 1992 Peace Accord systematically isolates RENAMO and the generality of the Mozambican population (Shikani, 2012).

In this new conflict, RENAMO demands three major reforms. Firstly, it wants its members to have greater representation and participation in government institutions which are currently dominated by FRELIMO. In particular it wants greater inclusion of its former combatants in the country's army. However, an observer commented that FRELIMO is unlikely to allow RENAMO access to institutions of power and authority because of the latter's unpredictability (Mutendeni, 2016).

Secondly, RENAMO alleges that the electoral system is not transparent enough to guarantee flawless democratic processes in the country. Here, it demands greater representation in government in order to veto election outcome when FRELIMO tempers with electoral processes. Thirdly, RENAMO asks for equitable share of the country's natural resources (Shikani, 2012). RENAMO complains that FRELIMO is keeping spoils of the country's wealth to itself. It was in this context RENAMO leader Dhlakama once described the former Mozambican President, Armando Guebuza as a "robber-in-chief of public funds" (Mambondiani, 2012). Closely related to the above is RENAMO's seemingly reasonable demand for autonomy in regions where it won majority votes (Bueno, et al., 2015) in the 2011 General Elections. The proposal carefully follows the current Mozambican practice of dual administration for the elected municipal governments, where there is an elected assembly and president (mayor) and district administrators.

While FRELIMO argues that devolution of power would undermine national unity, RENAMO maintains that decentralisation would ensure justice as parties would exercise power where they command popularity (Hanlon, 2015). Moreover, RENAMO asserts that devolution of power would eliminate ills that are caused by the 'the winner takes all' political model which divides the nation into winners and losers thereby sowing the seeds of conflict. RENAMO further attacks the 'winner takes all' political paradigm because not only does it result in wasted votes but empowers the 'winner' to introduce policies aimed at the pursuance of selfish political agendas at the expense of building national unity (Dingane, 2017). However, while devolution of powers could act as a panacea to the country's political ills, FRELIMO argues that the demand is a ruse by RENAMO to dominate provincial governments north of the Save River where it has been winning majority votes (Dzinesa and Motsani, 2013).

Further, Regalia cautions against underestimating the

purpose of RENAMO's insurrection (Regalia, 2017). Concomitantly, Hultman (2009) argues that by targeting specific sectors strategic to the country's economy RENAMO is resorting to its old guerrilla and destabilisation tactics ostensibly to extract concessions from the government which it has not been able to ascend to through the ballot box. Central to this, stratagem has been the disruption of transport routes which undermines commercial operations in the country. Similarly, Dzinesa and Motsani (2013) postulate that the flare-up of tensions between RENAMO and FRELIMO is a sequential outcome of RENAMO's crushing defeat in the 2009 General elections which demonstrated that RENAMO was unlikely to secure political power through democratic processes and was therefore facing political extinction (Dzinesa and Motsani, 2013). Consequently military confrontation is a device through which it seeks to revive its waning political fortunes.

Yesteryear RENAMO was synonymous with brutality characterised by murder, rape, slavery, kidnapping of youngsters and looting of assets. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that in the current conflict which resumed in 2011 RENAMO has largely abandoned terrorism. Generally, it targets government forces and installations and FRELIMO party members (Gumangeyi, 2017). By maintaining some presence in rural areas RENAMO has successfully sold a dummy, prompting FRELIMO to unleash violence upon the civilian population.

Respondents from the Mossurize District of Manica province claim that FRELIMO is implementing terror warfare in the current civil war (Albert, 2017). This accounts for the thousands of Mozambicans who have sought refuge in neighbouring Zimbabwe (Kuda, 2017). While the ill-treatment of the Ndau could be linked to their ethnic connection with RENAMO leadership several respondents were of the view that government forces were implementing terror tactics to strike fear into the rural population so that they force the populace to relocate to government controlled areas (Tsikwi, 2017). The tactics range from indiscriminate killing, confiscation of property and animals, burning alive suspected RENAMO collaborators and the destruction of homes and crops. In this regard, government forces' ill conduct resonates with the views of the former President of Mozambique Samora Machel who at some point remarked that "those who deal with bandits will die with the bandits" (Thailer, 2012). In the final analysis, RENAMO has gained political mileage over FRELIMO as its counter-insurgency strategy has boomeranged, costing the ruling party of rural support as reflected in Table 1.

Conclusion

The paper critiqued Tavuyanago's publication on RENAMO. In particular, it drew attention to the article's glaring shortcomings such as the dearth of ground based methodologies, silence on RENAMO's brutality and to

credit RENAMO for ushering in an area of democracy in Mozambique when in actual fact it was created as an agent of destabilisation that only attempted to engage with democratic processes at the tail end of its history. While the author reasonably drew his conclusion from the prevailing geopolitical situation then, he tended to speak too soon; his position that RENAMO would not return to war has been proved wrong by RENAMO's declaration of war on the Mozambican government in 2012. What emerges therefore from the discussion is that the article was overtly written from a RENAMO perspective. This paper has drawn attention to RENAMO's old omitted and new grievances which include FRELIMO's monopolistic tendencies in governance, indulgence in corruption and the desire to by RENAMO to control government structures in areas where it commands popularity. While the paper acknowledges RENAMO's argument for returning to the trenches, it has shown however that the return to war is a gimmick by the movement directed at regaining visibility on the country's political landscape. This became a matter of necessity following its declining popularity in the country's latter elections. However, the paper has shown that the gamble has paid dividends: the war has given RENAMO a chance to mobilise support in areas it controls and also the unmeasured response by FRELIMO to unleash violence on civilian population has arguably contributed to RENAMO's improved approval rating in rural communities north of the Save River. In summation, the paper argues that the return to war by RENAMO is a spontaneous expression of anger over FRELIMO's determination to pursue exclusive politics in Mozambique and a statement that 'old traditions die hard'.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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Full Length Research Paper

Why is Tanzanian opposition weak twenty five years since its re-introduction?

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This paper examines the performance of opposition parties and the prospects of multiparty politics in Tanzania. At independence in 1961 and during Colonial Rule, Tanganyika now Tanzania Mainland was enjoying a multiparty democracy but moved to one party state during 1970s. The Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has won all elections since re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992. The debate now is on the performance of Tanzania's opposition parties. Some scholars argue that many Tanzanians especially smallholders and rural inhabitants have strong loyalty to the ruling party CCM despite the economic difficulties they face. They further argue that, this strong loyalty to CCM is largely a result of lack of a strong alternative among the political parties, and nostalgia for the party which brought them independence and which has maintained relative peace. They also maintain that, it will simply take time for such nostalgia to fade and for a pro-rural challenge to the CCM to emerge; otherwise, age appears to have no significant effect on CCM support both Tanzanians old and young are loyal to the CCM. However, others claim that even if CCM is enjoying the power of the incumbency past elections results show that the margin of votes across constituencies for the CCM is in steady decline, thus challenging its dominance'. This paper is set to contribute to this live debate but taking the readers to a slightly different view point. In this paper, it is argued that, in spite of the claims made on the nature and quality of electoral institutions, and electoral system, opposition parties in the country have remained both numerically institutionally weak and fragmented. It is further argued that failure of the Tanzanian opposition parties is largely a product of internal weaknesses.

Key words: Tanzanian opposition, elections, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), political parties, politics.

INTRODUCTION

The United Republic of Tanzania was formed on 26th April, 1964 after the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The Constitution of Tanzania defined the United Republic of Tanzania as a democratic and socialist state, which adhered to multiparty democracy. At independence in 1961 and during Colonial Rule, Tanganyika now Tanzania Mainland was enjoying a multiparty democracy¹. According to the Encyclopedia of the Nations during this

time, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was established in 1954, was the overwhelmingly dominant political party in the country. Other political parties of this era included the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), the African National Congress (ANC), and the All Muslim National Unity of Tanganyika Party (AMNUT). While this was the case in Tanganyika, in Zanzibar, there were three important political parties prior to independence. These were the ZNP (Zanzibar Nationalist Party, ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party), and ZPPP (Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party). On February 5, 1977, ASP the ruling party of Zanzibar and TANU merged into the

¹ Tanzania - Political parties, Encyclopedia of the Nations accessed at [<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Tanzania-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html>]

Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or Revolutionary Party.

Following Constitutional amendments of 1965, Tanzania mainland (formerly Tanganyika) had only one political party the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) while Zanzibar following Revolution of 1964 had only one political party the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP). So from 1965 till 1977 Tanzania had only two sister political parties. Thereafter, the merging of ASP and TANU formed 'Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) on 5th February 1977'. Tanzania had one political party from 1977 to 1992. Multiparty politics were re-introduced in 1992, after the National Assembly passed the Political Parties Act No.5 of 1992. Since the re-introduction of multi-party system in Tanzania, the country has undergone five phases of General Elections carried out after every five years of tenure (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015). However, in all these general elections CCM has come out a winner. The major question is: *Why are Tanzanian opposition parties still weak twenty five years since re-introduction?* This paper answers this question and opens the debate on the internal weaknesses of the opposition parties in Tanzania.

Several debates exists concerning the performance of Tanzanian opposition parties, one such debate is on whether or not Tanzania is a democratic state. The debate on the form and content of Tanzania's constitution and democracy has been on the agenda throughout the four decades of Tanzania's independence. In the recent process of transition since the 1990s, a series of political reforms such as introducing multi-partyism have been undertaken with the view of widening the space for democracy. But several political scientists have contested that approach. For instance, Nyirabu (2002) argues that democratization is much more than the introduction of multiparty politics and debates the various components of the constitution that are obstacles to popular participation including the monopoly of political parties in politics. The mainstay of democracy according to this author is for the people to have a say and power in their own lives and not to depend on the power of political parties. Shaba (2007) argues differently and to him Tanzania is making a very good progress towards becoming a fully fledged democratic nation. He argues that there is a broad consensus that the process of consolidating the transition towards participatory political system in Tanzania over the past seventeen years has achieved remarkable success. Whereas, once predominantly under a single party hegemony, Tanzania today is characterized by a plurality of political parties. Though slow, the growth of the independent civil society has gained momentum. This paper argues that Tanzania is a fully fledged democratic state. A democratic state is a state that is organized through a system of government whereby the whole

population or all the eligible members of a state participate typically through elected representatives. In other words, a democracy entails providing people with the access to build a system of leadership to govern their socio-economic livelihoods of which Tanzania does. However, this definition is still not conclusive as one would challenge if indeed election is the single most important criteria of democracy.

Another hot debate is on whether or not failure of the Tanzanian opposition parties can be attributed to the opposition parties' being weakened by the ruling Party, CCM, or not. In her article 'Why the CCM won't lose', O'Gorman (2012) provides an empirical investigation of the factors contributing to single-party dominance in Tanzania. Despite the fact that Tanzania has had a multi-party democracy since 1995, the party which governed during single-party rule, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has won the vast majority of seats in the National Assembly in the first four multi-party elections. In order to understand the CCM's grip on power, O'Gorman (2012) analysed the results of a survey conducted amongst subsistence farmers in Tanzania, which provides information on farmers' livelihood conditions, access to media and political views, and hence provides insight into the preferences underlying voting behaviour. Using a survey conducted in 2008 amongst subsistence farmers, she notes that respondents tend to support the ruling party despite the rural neglect. Makulilo (2014) in his article, 'why the CCM is still in power in Tanzania?, a reply', questions the methodology used by O'Gorman (2012) and contests the associated key findings. He argues that the CCM's dominance is a function of the incomplete de-linking of the party from the state of the old authoritarian regime thereby suffocating political space not only for the opposition parties but also for the members of civil society in rural and urban areas. This paper is set to contribute to this live debate but taking the readers to a slightly different viewpoint. In this paper, it is argued that failure of the Tanzanian opposition parties is largely a product of internal weaknesses.

POLITICS OF OPPOSITION AND POWER OF THE INCUMBENCY IN AFRICA

There are scholars and political analysts who believe that, opposition parties in Africa loose during general elections because of the power of the incumbency. The incumbents usually refer to the individuals who are existing holders of a political office. It is usually used in reference to elections where races can often be defined as being between an incumbent and non-incumbents.

According to Burke (2016), the power of incumbency is

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the power to use the elected office for political gain. Depending on the office it can direct funds to projects that benefit supporters or punish opponents. Supporters of this idea argue that, incumbents have structural advantages over challengers during elections. They may use the state machinery to influence elections results in their favour. In some countries, even the electoral authorities may have been appointed by the incumbent. Burke (2016) further argues that, an individual who have been elected to an office say of a Ward Councilor or Member of Parliament in certain country can use the power of his office to pave the streets of supporters over other streets that may need it more. He or she might use what is called an "earmark" to direct spending to a district he or she represents over another one he or she does not represent. A Governor or a President of a certain Country can appoint friends and associates to state jobs as rewards for political support. What a challenger can do is to try to promise to deliver the services when elected into office. According to the author, such powers anyone who contest for the first time do not have. Proponents of this idea maintain that the power of incumbency is the main reason why so many office holders worldwide are re-elected more than their challengers especially in local governments, parliamentary, congress and the senate elections.

This paper argues that failure of opposition parties in Tanzania cannot be attributed to the 'the power of incumbency', rather it is an accumulation of internal weaknesses. Others like Hoffman and Robinson (2009) have mixed opinion concerning weaknesses of Tanzanian opposition. They establish that, on one hand there is an easy explanation that the absence of a vigorous political opposition results from a combination of little demand and uninspiring leadership, a line of reasoning that also defines the CCM as a relatively benign hegemon acceptable to the vast majority of Tanzanians. On the other hand, they protest that, although this argument is based on a significant amount of truth, it overlooks the CCM's deliberate attempts to suppress those who contest its near-monopoly of power, including its willingness to resort to coercion when other methods fail such realities raise serious questions about the ruling party's benevolent reputation. Despite these arguments, in this paper it is maintained that is difficult to believe that CCM use the state machinery to try to win elections because we have witnessed incumbent political parties loose elections in Countries like Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria. Can we argue here that ruling parties in these countries did not use the power of incumbency or they parties differ in the degree they apply the power? The author's position is that, Tanzania exhibits different characteristics. Authors like Norman (2009) establish that the strength of political parties varies and is associated with several factors, including youthfulness and ability to manage political parties as organizations. He further argues that, the strength of any

political party can be determined through two ways, subject to the eye of the examiner and the objectives of such examination. However, the common phenomenon is through number of people that support the political party, as expressed through votes attained in a particular election. The second criterion is the number of contestants who contest in various elections. Using the cited criterion, Tanzanian Opposition Parties still lie behind CCM.

MODELS OF COMPETITIVE POLITICAL PARTY BEHAVIOR

Scholars such as Pedersen (2012) believe that political party goals affect party behaviour and, hence, party democracy. They also maintain that, what parties seek to accomplish matters for the way they handle the power delegated to them by the voters. Party goals also affect how people understand and explain party behaviour. Furthermore, people's knowledge of what parties want affects what they expect them to do. For instance, coalition theory assumes that parties have identical goals, and hence are equally likely to join coalitions given the same situation. Likewise, rational choice theorists have developed a set of theories of competitive party behavior, as outlined in Strom (1990). According to the stipulated objectives of political parties, we can differentiate between (1) vote-seeking, (2) office-seeking, and (3) policy-seeking models of party behavior (Figure 1). The sub-sequent sub-sections explain these models which have said to influenced the study of parties even more than formal literature for some time now.

The Vote-Seeking Party

The model was developed out of Downs's (1957) study on electoral competition; the model assumes that political parties are "teams of men" whose main objective is to exploit their electoral support in order to gain control of the government. Consequently, scholars argue that, these political parties commonly known as "Downsian parties" are not only vote seekers but vote maximizers. They further argue that, this forms the basis of Downs's theory of electoral competition. Conversely, Downs's explanation of the vote-seeking hypothesis remains underdeveloped; partly because of this neglect, following theorists (such as Robertson, 1976; Melvin and Ordeshook, 1970) have amended Downs's supposition in a variety of ways. They argue that, if turnout is variable and vote seeking ultimately serves office ambitions, then in a single district, it makes more sense to maximize pluralities than votes. While, in multi-district contests, the rational party leader maximizes his (or her) probability of winning a majority of the contested seats. However, one short-coming with this model is that, it is too euro-centric.




Figure 1. Range of feasible party behaviors.
Source: Strom (1990).

It was developed to explain voting behaviour and political parties formulation in Europe especially Britain. It may not fit to explain political scenario in Africa, where its multiparty systems is not well developed and there are many small parties and declining social groups, which may not fit the logic of "catch-all" competition.

The Office-Seeking Party

The foremost objective of Office-seeking parties is to maximize their control over political office and not votes (Strom, 1990). In his article, Strom (1990) defined office benefits as 'private goods which are bestowed on recipients of politically discretionary governmental and sub-governmental appointments'. Hence, office-seeking deeds consist in the quest of such goods, beyond their electoral or policy value. Other authors such as Ian and Laver (1986) report, that even if political office may well contribute to electoral success or policy effectiveness, it is not considered office seeking. While on one hand, the vote-seeking party is familiar from work on electoral competition, on the other hand, the office-seeking party has been developed mainly to study government coalitions, especially parliamentary democracies. As a result, the office-seeking party, aspire to make best use of its control of elected office, often defined in terms of

government portfolios. This model may to some extent explain the current activities of opposition political parties in Tanzania. Opposition parties after the 2015 General Election had 114 parliamentary seats (though currently some have shifted to CCM) and they were controlling several local government authorities including, Arusha, Moshi, Hai, Moshi Municipality, Kigoma, Temeke, Ubungu, Kinondoni, Singida East, and Mbeya city. Their political activities prove that, they are maximizing control of these elected offices to gain popularity which could help them in future elections, the same could be said for CCM. Norman (2009) report that some political parties and/or leaders in Tanzania (such as Rev. Mtikira Former Chairman of DP, Chadema MPs, etc) are popular due to the uncommon behavior observed by the leaders or followers of such a party. The tendency of some these leaders to frequently petition on matters related to governance and elections may capture the attention of the voters and lead to popularity.

Another weakness of this model is its bias towards those political parties which have gained control of the government offices. It does not offer an alternative solution to political parties which participate in election and do not gain control of any government portfolio the scenario which is also present in Tanzania. It only assumes that all political parties which participate in elections do gain government portfolios which could not

be the case sometimes.

The Policy-Seeking Party

Authors point out that, the policy-seeking party normally maximizes its impact on public policy. This model like office-seeking model is also resulting from coalition studies (Strom, 1990). This model was a response to the "policy-blind" axioms of game theoretic studies of government development and specifically the assumption that all permissible coalitions are equally possible. Policy-based coalition theory instead assumes that coalitions will be made by parties that are "connected" (Axelrod, 1970), or at least close to each other, in policy space. They typically assume that parties also hunt office at least instrumentally, as elective office is taken to be a precondition for policy influence. Thus the policy-seeking party is concerned about government portfolios, as well as about the ideological disposition of the coalition in which it participates (Ian and Laver, 1986). Since the trade-off between these objectives has never been resolved, the policy-seeking party remains the least adequately developed model of competitive party behavior. Since this model of party behavior is less well developed than the other two, it is also more difficult to disprove. However, no party should join a government without effecting policy change in its favor. In this article, it is argued that, political parties in Tanzania do not exhibit characteristics of Policy-Seeking Parties; rather, they are more off Office-Seeking Parties.

Some scholars such as Strom (1990) propose a Unified Model of Party Behavior. They claim that, a more general behavioral theory of competitive political parties requires an understanding of the interrelations and trade-offs between different objectives. We can begin by thinking of political parties as "going concerns," whose objectives include all three goals discussed above: votes, office, and policy. Pure vote seekers, office seekers, or policy seekers are unlikely to exist. We can empirically identify party objectives, or mixes of objectives, through manifest party behavior. But the best way to understand the relationships between office-seeking, policy-seeking, and vote-seeking behavior is to develop a unified theory of party competition.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Here, methods of data gathering and analysis are presented and discussed, which includes a description of data gathering methods and tools along with data analysis approach. More details are presented subsequently.

Methods of data gathering

This study applied a documentary and literature review method to

gather the required information on nature and performance of opposition parties and the prospects of multiparty politics in Tanzania. Relevant literature and documents which were reviewed included files on past Tanzanian general elections starting with the pre-independence elections that involved the Legislative Council Election which took place on February 1959 to the most recent 2015 general elections. Some of the documents were accessed through the African Elections Database's website and the United Republic of Tanzania National Electoral Commission (NEC) official website. In addition to the mentioned documents, in this study various literatures were reviewed. The reviewed literature among other things debates on the nature, structure and performance of the opposition parties during the past Tanzanian general elections. The information obtained from these sources helped to answer the key research question.

There is a common agreement among social scientists that no single study can be done without a literature review. Literature review and or documentary review have been used by social science researchers mainly as part of group of methodologies of data collection. However, literature review can stand alone as robust technique of data gathering. Use of literature review technique in gathering data is very common within the field of political science. For instance, Malipula (2014) conducted a literature review to establish a structural and historical explanation that attributes lack of ethnic salience in Tanzanian politics to a particular ethnic structure, to certain colonial administrative and economic approaches, and to a sustained nation-building ethos. Likewise, Montero and Gunther (2003) used literature review to make a critical reassessment of political parties in Western Europe. Furthermore, Disch et al. (2009) used the literature review method to study the anti-corruption approaches. Also, Bogaards (2014) used similar methodology to study electoral alliances in Africa. Summary of the key literatures reviewed in this study is presented in Table 1:

Methods of data analysis

Qualitative data were analyzed through the use of Content Analysis where information gathered from the documents and literatures were transcribed into word document. Thereafter, key themes and patterns were formed and codes established. The qualitative information were then integrated with quantitative information mainly from the African Elections Database (2011) and the United Republic of Tanzania National Electoral Commission (NEC) Official Website (2015) to provide more meaningful analysis. In analyzing quantitative data, descriptive statistics were conducted where percentage and frequencies on past elections results were computed. Results were then presented in tables, to show how each of political party performed as far as Presidential and Parliamentary election were concerned.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION ON TANZANIA'S PAST ELECTIONS' RESULTS

The history of Tanzania's General Elections dates back to pre independence 1950s. The 1958/1959 Legislative Council Election (Figure 2) saw Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) which later in 1977 merged with the Afro-Shiraz Party to form '*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*' (Revolutionary Party which is the current ruling Party in Tanzania) winning with 28 seats out of 30 available seats compared to other political parties who had only 2 seats. It should be noted that this was the Multiparty Election.

Table 1. Key literature reviewed in this study.

S/No.	Literature/Document Reviewed	Reasons for Selecting the Literature
1	African Elections Database (2011). Tanzania Election Results (1962-2010). [http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html#2005_Presidential_Election]	To trace Tanzania's past election results in order to establish the performance of different participating parties
2	O'Gorman, M. (2012). 'Why the CCM Won't Lose: The Roots of Single Party Dominance in Tanzania', <i>Journal of Contemporary African Studies</i> , Vol. 30 (2): 313-333.	To establish what is known about performance of the Tanzanian political parties and trace the development of the debate
3	Makulilo, A. B. (2014). Why the CCM Is Still in Power in Tanzania? A Reply [http://ssrn.com/abstract=2458778 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2458778]	To establish what is known about performance of the Tanzanian political parties and trace the development of the debate
4	Hoffman, B. and Robinson, L. (2009). Tanzania's Missing Opposition. <i>Journal of Democracy</i> , 20 (4):123-136	To establish what is known about performance of Tanzania's Opposition parties.
5	Bogaards, M. (2014). Electoral Alliances in Africa. What Do We Know, What Can We Do? <i>Journal of African Elections</i> , 13 (1): 25-42.	To establish what is known about performance of Tanzania's Opposition parties.
6	The United Republic of Tanzania National Electoral Commission (NEC) Official Website (2015) [http://www.nec.go.tz/matokeo-files] accessed on 24/11/2015.	To trace Tanzania's past election results in order to establish the performance of different participating parties
7	Teshome, W. (2009). Opposition Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Africa: A Critical Analysis. <i>International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences</i> , 3(7): 1624- 1638.	To establish the performance of Opposition parties in Africa at larger
8	Ian, B. and Laver, M. J. (1986). Office Seeking and Policy Pursuit in Coalition Theory. <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly</i> 11: 485-506.	To establish what have been theorized about party strength and weaknesses
9	Nohlen, D., Krennerich, M. & Thibaut, B. (1999). <i>Elections in Africa: A data handbook</i> . 885pp.	To establish the performance of Opposition parties in Africa at larger
10	Strom, K. (1990). A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties. <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> , 34 (2): 565-598.	To establish what have been theorized about party strength and weaknesses

Number of Seats (30)*




Figure 2. September 1958/February 1959 Legislative Council Election. *An additional 34 seats were reserved for appointees. Registered Voters is not available, Total Votes (Voter Turnout) is not available. Source: African Elections Database (2011).

The votes TANU gathered from this election suggests that it was founded on a very strong foundation and was made to last longer. From the beginning, Tanganyikans had believed in TANU and its leadership under Julius Nyerere. The current CCM is still reaping fruits of this strong foundation.

Tanganyika had another pre-independence Legislative Council elections held on 30th August, 1960. Unlike the September 1958 elections, this time the electoral authorities allocated more number of seats (71) to be contested by political parties. Likewise, during this election it was TANU which won all seats, because even

Table 2. The August 30, 1960 Legislative Council Election Results.

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats (71)*
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)	100,581	82.82	70
African National Congress (ANC)	337	0.28	-
Independents	20,527	16.90	1

*The single independent seat was won by a loyal TANU member who opposed the official candidate and immediately joined the TANU ranks after his victory. Registered Voters were approximately 885,000 people, whereas Total Votes (Voter Turnout) was Not Available and Total Valid Votes were 121,445.

Source: African Elections Database (2011).

the single independent candidate who won a seat in Mbulu was a loyal TANU member who opposed the official candidate and immediately joined the TANU ranks after his victory. The African National Congress (ANC) which was the only party challenging TANU did not win any seat and ended up having a total of 0.28% of votes (see Table 2). At this point TANU had established itself as the only strong unifying political party which can lead the country. Leaders of ANC later on established new political parties to oppose TANU now CCM, however, they did not succeed. For example, the ANC which was formed by former TANU members who broke away from TANU in 1958 due to dissatisfaction regarding TANU's position and ideology on Africanization and especially TANU's definition of 'Africanization' which included people of all races who were citizens of Tanganyika was purely a discriminatory political party. In spite of sharing the same name with the ANC of South Africa, Tanganyika's ANC was radically different from its counterpart. The Tanganyika's ANC, wanted Tanganyika to be exclusively a domain for blacks. Its leader Mr. Zuberi Mtemvu himself was virulently an anti-white, anti-Asian and against any other non-black even if they were citizens of Tanganyika (Mwakikagile, 2010). The Party' doctrine of 'Africa for Africans', meant only one thing, Africa for black Africans. This doctrine according to Mwakikagile was contrary to the advice by Dr. Martin Luther King who said: 'We must all learn to live together as brothers (and sisters) or we will all perish together as fools' (Mwakikagile, 2010).

The newly formed opposition parties (of 1990s) in Tanzania seem to have inherited similar syndrome of internal weaknesses. Teshome (2009) reports that most of the opposition parties in Africa are established around the personalities of individuals, lack internal democracy, suffer from inter-party and intra-party conflicts, have severe shortage of finance, and lack strong base and experience. Their weaknesses also include bad organization and weak connection with the popular constituencies. Arguing in similar lines, Mwakikagile (2010) establishes that, Rev. Christopher Mtikira used the doctrines reminiscent of the African National Congress (ANC) in Tanganyika in the late fifties and early sixties when the party was led by Zuberi Mtemvu. Mtikila the founder and first chairperson of the Democratic Party

(DP) also was an anti-whites, anti-Asian and against any other non-blacks. His slogans like 'wazawa' (natives) and 'gabachori' (non-natives) echoed the sentiments of other racial purists witnessed in the 1950s during the fight for independence such as 'Africa for Africans'. It is not surprising therefore that Tanganyikans now Tanzania did not trust opposition political parties and Tanzanians continue to distrust them.

The same reasons can be said about the November 1st 1962 Presidential Election where TANU candidate *Mwalimu* (Teacher) Julius Nyerere won with more than 98% of votes leaving Mr. Zuberi Mtemvu of ANC with less than 2% of total votes casted (Table 3). Mwalimu Julius Nyerere was a non-racial in his perspective, and this position got him into conflict with his colleagues in his Party and the Government, but maintained his stand.

The 1962 and the pre-independence election results had portrayed an image that Tanganyika had only one powerful political party supported by the majority. It was because of the weaknesses of the opposition parties that the government decided to abolish multipartism and opted for a single party democracy thereafter. However, it is still debatable if really weaknesses of the opposition parties could have been a sufficient reason for their abolition.

The decision to turn Tanganyika into a one-party state was made by the TANU's National Executive Committee and on the 14th January 1963 this decision was announced by President Nyerere (Carter, 1986). The President was given by the National Executive Committee an authority to appoint a Presidential Commission to consider the changes to the constitutions of the Republic and of the Party that might be necessary to give effect to this decision. The Commission was appointed on 28th January, 1964 and reported on 22nd March, 1965. The Commission had 13 members, two of whom were prominent Europeans and one Asian. The Commission invited written evidence and also took verbal evidence throughout the country. Its deliberations were guided by the terms of two important memoranda drawn up by the President and as a result the final report was deeply influenced by President Nyerere's approach to the whole subject, an approach which, as it turned out, received widespread support during the course of the verbal evidence.

Table 3. November 1st 1962 Presidential Election Results.

Candidate (Party)	Number of Votes	% of Votes
Julius Nyerere (TANU)	1,127,978	98.15
Zuberi Mtemvu (ANC)	21,276	1.85

Registered Voters were approximately 1,800,000, Total Votes (Voter Turnout) Not Available (N/A), Invalid/Blank Votes Not Available and Total Valid Votes were 1,149,254.

Source: African Elections Database (2011).

Table 4. Results for Tanzanian Presidential Election (1980-1990).

Candidate/Year	For		Against		Total votes		Total valid votes		Invalid/Blank votes	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere /1980-CCM	5,570,883	95.5	258,040	4.5	5,985,942	100	5,828,923	100	157,019	2.6
Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi/1985-CCM	4,778,114	95.7	215,626	4.3	5,181,999	100	4,993,740	100	188,259	3.6
Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi/1990-CCM	5,198,120	97.8	117,366	2.2	5,425,282	100	5,315,486	100	109,796	2.0

Source: Nohlen et al. (1999).

The Commission laid finally at rest the view that the party should not be a small, elite leadership group and insisted that it should be a mass organisation open to every citizen of Tanzania. This decision finally established the character of TANU as constituting a national movement; indeed the word 'party', with its sectional implications, was no longer an appropriate description and the resulting pattern of Government, as Professor Pratt has suggested, 'was in many ways closer to a no party system than to a one party system (Ibid)'. It is clear from the evidence that this concept fully reflected the mood of the people, who showed no interest at all in entrenching ideologically exclusive elite, but saw the necessity for a single national movement to emphasize and safeguard the unity of the nation.

The assumption was that, single party democracy would strengthen nationhood, unity and solidarity among citizens. During single party democracy, there were only one presidential candidate and voters were asked to decide whether they vote for him or against him. The opposition votes in this system ought to have been manifesting itself in a form of 'against votes'. Reading across the various single party Presidential election results one can note that the against votes did not exceed 5% (Table 4), and most CCM supporters may argue that this suggested a solid trust to the CCM while others may argue it showed lack of alternative. This paper subscribes to the former than the later largely, because, voters were not forced to the ballot box. In all elections during that time CCM came out with a landslide victory of over and above 95%.

CCM is still enjoying the fruits of decisions made by TANU in the 1960s which presented the party as 'everyone's party' and it will continue to benefit for many years to come. Tanzanian opposition has failed to come up with a candidate of their own. During elections

opposition leaders will defer their internal nomination until CCM finishes its nomination to wait for anyone who is discontented with CCM decision of not picking him to join their parties. As a result all candidates who seemed to bring some sort of challenges were former CCM leaders. Mr. Augustine Mrema for example joined the National Convention for Construction and Reform–Mageuzi Party and became its presidential candidate in the 1995 Tanzanian Presidential Elections. He became the leading opposition Candidate with 27.77% of the total votes (Table 4). The problem with this methodology is that, parties with little or no screening techniques tend to absorb everyone who appears to support them, in so doing they end up picking candidates whom they don't know very much and in the end some become liabilities and sources of internal divisions. Regarding this argument a good example is that of Mr. John Shibuda the former MP of the 'Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo', in several occasions he was against his party's decision.

A closer look at Table 5 reveals that in the 1995 Tanzanian Presidential Election, opposition gathered a total of 38.18% of votes the highest number of votes than in any other elections. This opposition performance was triggered by the fact that it was the first multiparty elections after it was abolished in the 1960s. Some voters who were born in between 1965 and 1992 never saw multiparty system and were excited but slowly that excitement faded out because the opposition parties did not meet their expectations and the number of opposition supporters went on decreasing election after election as it can be witnessed in the subsequent Tables.

Parliamentary election results in Table 6 show that CCM had majority of the seats in the parliament (186) as compared to opposition (46). During this time the most popular opposition party was the Civic United Front

Table 5. Tanzanian Presidential Election, 1995 Results.

Candidate	Party	Votes	% of total valid votes
Mr. Benjamin W. Mkapa	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	4,026,422	61.82
Mr. Augustine L.Mrema	National Convention for Construction and Reform–Mageuzi	1,808,616	27.77
Prof. Ibrahim H. Lipumba	Civic United Front	418,973	6.43
Mr. John M.Cheyo	United Democratic Party	258,734	3.97

Total votes = 6,846,681(100%); Invalid/blank votes =333,936 (4.9% of total votes); Total valid votes = 6,512,745 (100%)
Source: African Elections Database (2011).

Table 6. Results* of The National Assembly Election of 29 October 1995.

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats 232 (269)***
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	3,814,206	59.22	186 (214)
National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi)	1,406,343	21.83	16 (19)
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)	396,825	6.16	3 (4)
Civic United Front (CUF)	323,432	5.02	24 (28)
United Democratic Party (UDP)	213,547	3.32	3 (4)
Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA)	76,636	1.19	-
National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA)	60,707	0.94	-
Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD)	41,257	0.64	-
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	27,963	0.43	-
National League for Democracy (NLD)	26,666	0.41	-
United People's Democratic Party (UPDP)	19,841	0.31	-
Popular National Party (PONA)	18,155	0.28	-
Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maendeleo (PPT-Maendeleo)	15,335	0.24	-

*In seven constituencies of Dar-es-Salaam, the results were nullified in seven constituencies due to irregularities. A new round of voting took place in these constituencies on 19 November 1995. **Due to conflicting data regarding registered voters, total votes cast, voter turnout, and the number of invalid/blank votes, those figures were excluded from the table above. ***232 members were directly elected; The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined [excluding the 5 Zanzibar delegates and Attorney-General].

Source: African Elections Database (2011).

(CUF) with its strong hold in Pemba Zanzibar. CUF got 24 seats all of them from Zanzibar followed by the National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi) of Mr Augustine Lyatonga Mrema which obtained 16 seats all of them from Tanzania Mainland. Failure for opposition parties to get seats from both sides of the union i.e. Zanzibar and Tanzania Mainland shows that the opposition parties were not accepted by all citizens, they are not 'nationalistic parties', hence, voters saw them as 'none-unifying' and therefore they cannot advance 'nationhood'. The only party which has been getting many seats from both sides of the union during all these elections is CCM. It should be noted here that CCM was formed by a merging of two very strong political parties, Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) from Zanzibar and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) from Tanganyika now Tanzania Mainland. Suffice to say CCM was built on a solid foundation and is still enjoying the fruits of the foundation. Many of these opposition political parties were formed out

of ad hoc meeting of friends who did not even know themselves very well. Consequently, internal conflicts and scramble for power were common.

The Tanzanian Presidential Election of the year 2000 witnessed CCM winning again and this time its presidential candidate Mr. Benjamin William Mkapa was competing for his second term in office (Table 7). Contrary to majority's expectation, the total votes which went to opposition declined by 20% from 38.18 to 28.26 votes. One would expect that, because they were dealing with the same opponent they would have improved their total votes but that wasn't the case. These election results confirm the general perception of the Tanzanians that, CCM presidential candidates are better in their second terms than in their first terms (with few exceptions). It can be predicted that CCM will win the 2020 elections comfortably regardless who the opposition choose as their candidates. If the opposition can't learn from their mistakes, they should forget going to state house soon.

Likewise, CCM won the 29 October 2000 National

Table 7. Results for the 2000 Tanzanian Presidential Election.

Candidate	Party	Votes	% of total valid votes
Mr. Benjamin W. Mkapa	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	5,863,201	71.74
Prof. Ibrahim H. Lipumba	Civic United Front	1,329,077	16.26
Mr. Augustine L.Mrema	National Convention for Construction and Reform–Mageuzi	637,115	7.80
Mr. John M.Cheyo	United Democratic Party	342,891	4.20

Total votes = 8,517,598 (100); Invalid/blank votes =345,314 (4.05 % of total votes); Total valid votes = 8,172,284 (100%)
Source: African Elections Database (2011).

Table 8. Results for the National Assembly Election of 29 October 2000.

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats 231 (295)*
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	4,628,127	65.19	202 (258)
Civic United Front (CUF)	890,044	12.54	17 (22)
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	652,504	9.19	4 (5)
United Democratic Party (UDP)	315,303	4.44	3 (4)
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)	300,567	4.23	4 (5)
National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi)	256,591	3.61	1 (1)
United People's Democratic Party (UPDP)	14,789	0.21	-
Popular National Party (PONA)	11,731	0.17	-
Tanzania People's Party (TPP)	10,206	0.14	-
Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA)	9,647	0.14	-
Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD)	7,550	0.11	-
National League for Democracy (NLD)	2,507	0.04	-
National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA)	70	0.00	-

*231 members were directly elected; The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined. Registered Voters = 10,088,484; Total Votes (Voter Turnout) = 7,442,798 (73.8%); Invalid/Blank Votes = 343,162; Total Valid Votes = 7,099,636.

Source: African Elections Database (2011).

Assembly Election with majority of seats 202 compared to opposition's 29 (Table 8). The Civic United Front (CUF) again was the most popular opposition party followed by the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP). Reasons for the failure are almost the same 'internal conflicts' and lack of long term vision. For example, the National Convention for Construction and Reform - Mageuzi (NCCR- Mageuzi) was just coming from a serious internal conflict which forced its National Chair Mr. Augustine Mrema and his followers to renounce the party and join the TLP, therefore opposition was divided at a time when unity was highly needed.

The winning story continues for CCM as the losing story for the opposition during the Tanzanian Presidential Election of 2005. During this election, CCM had a new presidential candidate Mr. Jakaya Kikwete, while nearly all opposition parties had the same presidential candidate defeated in the previous elections (Table 9). This was the election where CCM won most comfortably more than any other election since the times of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and Mr. Ali Hassan Mwinyi (80.28%). This election again witnesses the opposition camp failing to

get the candidate they were expecting from CCM. It should be noted here that Chadema had delayed its nomination of the presidential candidate to wait for unsatisfied CCM members to join them. This time it did not work, there were no influential member of CCM who had opted to join the opposition; as a result, the Chadema for example, opted for their youthful chairman Mr. Freeman Mbowe to vie for the position which he lost badly. It was only during this particular election when the opposition for the first time, conceded defeat. Political scientists say, during this election opposition had lost before voting and conceding defeat was not only necessary but more meaningful.

The opposition again lost the December 14 2005 National Assembly Election (Table 10). For many years now Tanzania has been a democratic country which follows principles of democracy. Democracy as system of government has some basic principles, namely: Rule of law, freedom of press, respect for human right, active political participation and active political processes. Other essential features of democracy in the advance democracies are: ideologically based political parties,

Table 9. The 2005 Tanzanian Presidential Election Results.

Candidate	Party	Votes	% of total valid votes
Mr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	9,123,952	80.28
Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba*	Civic United Front	1,327,125	11.68
Mr. Freeman Mbowe	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo	668,756	5.88
Mr. Augustine Mrema	Tanzania Labour Party	84,901	0.75
Mr. Sengondo Mvungi***	National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi**	55,819	0.49
Mr. Christopher Mtikila	Democratic Party	31,083	0.27
Dr. Emmanuel Makaidi	National League for Democracy	21,574	0.19
Ms. Anna Senkoro****	Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maendeleo	18,783	0.17
Prof. Leonard Shayo	Demokrasia Makini	17,070	0.15
Mr. Paul Henry Kyara	Sauti ya Umma	16,414	0.14

Registered Voters = 16,401,694; Total Votes (Voter Turnout) = 11,875,927 (72.4%); Invalid/blank votes = 510,450 (4.29 % of total votes); Total valid votes = 11,365,477 (100%); *The best opposition candidate of all time; ** The rapidly dying political party; **** The first Female candidate in the history of Tanzanian Presidential Election. Note: with exception of Prof. Lipumba and Mr. Mtikila all opposition candidates originated from one region; that is, Kilimanjaro. ****Sengondo Mvungi was also supported by the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA), Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD), and United People's Democratic Party (UPDP). Source: African Elections Database (2011).

Table 10. The 14 December 2005 National Assembly Election Results.

Party	Number of Votes	% of Votes	Number of Seats 232 (323)*
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	7,579,897	69.99	206 (275)
Civic United Front (CUF)	1,542,254	14.24	19 (31)
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)	888,133	8.20	5 (11)
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	306,219	2.83	1 (1)
National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi)	239,452	2.21	-
United Democratic Party (UDP)	155,887	1.44	1 (1)
Chama cha Haki na Usitawi (CHAUSTA)	38,085	0.35	-
Jahazi Asilia	21,042	0.19	-
Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maendeleo (PPT-Maendeleo)	13,532	0.12	-
Democratic Party (DP)	11,876	0.11	-
Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA)	6,845	0.06	-
Sauti ya Umma (SAU)	6,085	0.06	-
National League for Democracy (NLD)	6,054	0.06	-
United People's Democratic Party (UPDP)	5,456	0.05	-
National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA)	3,459	0.03	-
Demokrasia Makini (MAKINI)	2,102	0.02	-
Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD)	1,625	0.02	-
Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD)	1,510	0.01	-
Vacant**	-	-	-(4)

*232 members were directly elected; The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined; **Only 6 of 10 seats reserved for presidential appointees have been filled. Registered Voters = 16,407,318; Total Votes (Voter Turnout) = Not Available (N/A); Invalid/Blank Votes = Not Available; Total Valid Votes = 10,829,513. Source: African Elections Database (2011).

internal democracy in party politics, political party supremacy and good governance (Dauda, 2015). It should be noted here that this particular election as for all previous ones was free, fair and democratic. This is why opposition had to concede defeat.

It was not surprising that, opposition lost again during

the 2010 Tanzanian Presidential Election (Table 11). It is equally important to note here that only 8,626,283 voters equivalent to 42.8% of total registered voters (20,137,303) voted during this election; where, 227,889 votes (2.64% of total votes) were invalid votes. This was the worst voter turnout in the history of Tanzanian

Table 11. The 2010 Tanzanian Presidential Election Results.

Candidate	Party	Votes	% of total valid votes
Dr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	5,276,827	62.83%
Dr. Willibrod Slaa	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo	2,271,941	27.05
Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba	Civic United Front	695,667	8.28
Mr. Peter Kuga Mziray	Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maendeleo	96,933	1.15
Mr. Muttamwega Bhatt Mgayhwa	Tanzania Labour Party	17,462	0.21
Mr. Hashim Rungwe	National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi**	26,388	0.31
Mr. Yahmi Nassoro Dovutwa	United Peoples Democratic Party	13,176	0.16

Registered Voters = 20,137,303; Total Votes (Voter Turnout) = 8, 626, 283 (42.8% of registered voters)*; Invalid/blank votes = 227, 889 (2. 64% of total votes); Total Valid Votes = 8,398,394 (100%). *Worst voter turnout in the history of Tanzanian Presidential Election.
Source: African Elections Database (2011)

Table 12. The 31 October, 2010 National Assembly Election Results.

Party	Number of Seats = 239 (350)*
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)	186 (259)
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)	23 (48)
Civic United Front (CUF)	24 (36)
National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi)	4 (4)
United Democratic Party (UDP)	1 (1)
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	1 (1)
Other	- (1)

*239 members are directly elected; The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined. Seven additional members can be appointed by the President.
Source: African Elections Database (2011)

Presidential Election. Even if the discussion on reasons as to why so many voters did not vote is not part of this papers' subject matter, it is necessary to comment on it. The poor voter turnout could be attributed to lack of voter education which may be a result of limited awareness campaign from both the opposition and CCM. It is also difficult to establish that the low voter turnout benefited CCM than opposition, because even CCM members did not turn out to vote. CCM has more than eight million members countrywide. It is not possible that all voters who turned out were CCM members.

Like the Presidential Election, CCM won also the 31 October, 2010 National Assembly election as widely expected. Ad hoc preparations, internal/inter parties conflicts, lack of unity among and between political parties as well as vague ideologies and policies of the parties resulted to the opposition getting only 53 seats out of 239 available seats (Table 12). The parties therefore do not have clear-cut alternatives to present to the voters, and the programmes are of lesser importance than the personalities who represent the parties and contest elections. Second, only the incumbent party is able to reach down to the voters on a regular basis. The other parties do not have the necessary organisation or resources, and contact therefore becomes sporadic and ad-hoc. Finally, very serious conflicts within the parties

threaten both the stability and credibility of the parties and the party system (Magnar, 2000).

The Tanzanian Presidential Election of 2015 confirmed lack of unity among opposition political parties and internal conflicts. This time again the opposition camp failed to come up with a single candidate. Instead they fielded seven candidates to challenge CCM's Dr. John Pombe Joseph Magufuli. Again, like in 1995 elections, the opposition relied on the former CCM member Mr. Edward Lowasa to take them through of which he did not. Mr. Lowasa came second with 39.97% of total votes (in an election where opposition believed they will win) whereas, CCM's Magufuli gathered 58.46% of total votes (Table 12). It is important to note here that, prior to this election chadema had expelled three of its very important cadres namely: Mr. Zitto Zuberi Kabwe, Dr. Kitila Mkumbo (Now Prof.) and Mr. Samson Mwigamba. This was a bad move at making, because these cadres went on forming a new political part known as Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT). ACT was seen by many Tanzanians as the only viable alternative party to CCM which preaches nationhood, peace and unity. As a result, despite it only being few months old it entered into an election and its candidate came third after Dr. Magufuli and Mr. Lowasa by gathering a total of 98,763 votes.

Table 13. Tanzanian 2015 Presidential Election Results.

Candidate	Party	Votes	% of total valid votes
Dr. John P. Magufuli	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	8,882,935	58.46
Mr. Edward N. Lowassa	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo	6,072,848	39.97*
Ms. Anna Elisha Mghwira**	Alliance for Change and Transparency	98,763	0.65
Mr. Lutalosa Yembe	Alliance for Democratic Change	66,049	0.43
Mr. Hashim Rungwe	Chama cha Ukombozi wa Umma	49,256	0.32
Mr. Machmillan Elifatio Lyimo	Tanzania Labour Party	8,198	0.05
Mr. Janken Malik Kasambala	National Reconstruction Alliance	8,028	0.05
Mr. Fahmi Nassoro Dovutwa	United People's Democratic Party	7,785	0.05

Registered Voters = 23,254,485; Total Votes (Voter Turnout) = 15,193,862 (67.34% of registered voters)*; Invalid/blank votes = 402,248 (2.58% of total votes); Total Valid Votes = 15,193,862 (97.42% of voters who voted); * Is a combined effort of Four Registered Political Parties namely: Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (this is the first coalition of opposition parties to fail); Civic United Front; National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi and National League for Democracy; **The second female candidate in the history of Tanzanian Presidential Election.

Source: NEC Official Website (2015)

Perhaps the most damaging move for chadema and opposition in general was that of ousting its national Secretary General Dr. Willibrod Slaa in an attempt to attract the former CCM member Mr. Lowasa. In a highly-attended press conference broadcasted live on various television stations across the country Dr Slaa gave details of his decision not to give a nod to his party agreeing to receive Mr Edward Lowassa as the opposition's presidential flag bearer. Dr. Slaa pointed finger to Chadema presidential candidate Mr. Edward Lowassa as being corrupt and therefore unreliable as a leader. Chadema had lost credibility and public trust for accepting former Prime Minister Edward Lowassa who has incessantly been implicated in various corrupt practices (Majaliwa, 2015). He used a number of documented and undocumented examples to illustrate why Mr. Lowassa is tainted, suggesting that with all that 'liability', such a candidate cannot have the moral authority to become president. 'What has happened in my party is retrogressive, and since I do not agree with the move they have made, I have left Chadema and quit politics generally (*ibid*). To greater extent any serious analyst would expect the opposition to fail in 2015.

During the 2015 presidential elections the opposition camp gathered a combined 41.52% of the total votes (Table 13) but this percent is expected to go down in 2020 elections because the opposition is not making any meaningful efforts to improve or maintain its votes. Recent polls have indicated that President Dr. John Magufuli's popularity is increasing drastically countrywide. For instance, the polls which was commissioned by the Mwananchi Communication limited in February 2016 showed that, if elections were to be conducted in February 2016, Dr. John Pombe Joseph Magufuli of CCM will win by 75% whereas the main opposition leader Mr. Edward Ngoyayi Lowasa will lose the elections by scoring only 20% of votes. The polls also revealed that Dr. Magufuli's popularity among different cohorts is also

increasing. He is 75% popular among young people aged 26-35 years, 73% popular among those aged 36-45 years, 79% among rural voters (who are traditionally the majority of voters in Tanzania) and 78% popular among women (Kimboy, 2016). The former works minister is maintaining popularity in all zones, 82% central, 73% Coast, 68% Lake, 78% Northern (traditionally opposition's strong hold), 78% Southern and 92% Zanzibar (Kimboy, 2016). This might surprise many; just three months after the general election, voters are no longer interested with opposition politics. The mere fact is opposition parties are not performing. They are 'event based political parties' and in most circumstances are operating on 'activist basis'. The sooner they turn and operate as political parties, only then will they realize that it is better for them. Activism politics do not work in Tanzania.

It can be said here that the coalition formed by Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema), the Civic United Front; National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi) and National League for Democracy (NLD) was the coalition of the scrawny and its failure signifies a huge lack of faith among the general public on the opposition parties. Likewise, the 2015 elections witnessed the opposition parties losing their strong holds in Kigoma, Mwanza Urban and Musoma Urban, with key opposition figures losing in the process. In the list there is Mr. Ezekia Dibogo Wenje (Nyamagana constituency), Mr. Vincent Josephat Kiboko Nyerere (Musoma Urban constituency) and Mr. David Zacharia Kafulilla (Kigoma South constituency). Table 14 reveals more information regarding the Tanzania's 2015 National Assembly Elections results.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper agrees with the literature that, the process of

Table 14. Tanzanian 2015 National Assembly Elections.

Party	Votes	%	Seats				+/-
			Elected	Women	Appointed	Total	
Chama Cha Mapinduzi	8,021,427	55.04	188	64		252	
Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo	4,627,923	31.75	34	36		70	
Civic United Front	1,257,765	8.63	32	10		42	
Alliance for Change and Transparency	323,112	2.22	1	0		1	
NCCR–Mageuzi	218,209	1.50	1	0		1	
Chama cha Ukombozi wa Umma	23,058	0.16	0	0	0	0	0
Democratic Party	14,471	0.10	0	0	0	0	0
United Democratic Party	13,757	0.09	0	0	0	0	-1
Tanzania Labour Party	13,098	0.09	0	0	0	0	-1
ADA–TADEA	12,979	0.09	0	0	0	0	0
Alliance for Democratic Change	12,420	0.09	0	0	0	0	0
Chama cha Haki na Ustawi	8,217	0.06	0	0	0	0	0
Alliance for Tanzania Farmers Party	7,498	0.05	0	0	0	0	0
United People's Democratic Party	3,772	0.03	0	0	0	0	0
Jahazi Asilia	3,344	0.02	0	0	0	0	0
Progressive Party of Tanzania – Maendeleo	3,037	0.02	0	0	0	0	0
Chama Cha Kijamii	2,310	0.02	0	0	0	0	0
National League for Democracy	2,082	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
Union for Multiparty Democracy	1,975	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
Sauti ya Umma	1,810	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
National Reconstruction Alliance	1,467	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
Demokrasia Makini	1,226	0.01	0	0	0	0	0
Invalid/blank votes		-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	14,574,957	100	256	110	10	367	+17

Source: NEC Official Website (2015).

consolidating the transition towards participatory political system in Tanzania over the past seventeen years has achieved remarkable success. The country has also witnessed a remarkable transformation of the press. State-owned media outfits that had dominated for decades have now changed and become openings for different voices, not just the ruling party - a major step towards promoting democratic practice. This paradigm shift has also helped aggravate a critical relationship between a tangential media and government, which is a vital health element of a growing democracy.

Opposition parties in Tanzania are being challenged by many factors including institutional weaknesses in practically all opposition political parties as manifested by the lack of party philosophy or ideology, the functioning of party structures and processes, lack of participatory internal democracy due to deficit of communication between party leaders, followers and the general public. Despite the nature and quality of electoral institutions, and electoral system, opposition parties in this country have remained numerically weak and fragmented. It is concluded that Tanzania's opposition politics is weak, more than two decades after the re-introduction of

multiparty democracy, no opposition political party has emerged as a clear, credible, strong alternative to the ruling CCM and there is no indication of one being found in the near future. Power struggles have divided the country's opposition parties since the re-introduction of the multiparty democracy in the year 1995. The lack of internal democracy and weak foundations could be the opposition's downfall. No real challenges exist to CCM, in particular in rural areas, as the opposition parties neither have the organisation nor the resources to fully develop structures at all district/local levels in the vast country. No strong and well organised nationwide opposition has emerged – as in most other African countries.

The paper concludes also that the reasons for failure of opposition parties are generally internal and can be attributed to ad hoc preparations, internal/inter parties conflicts, lack of unity among and between political parties, pitiable organization and bad leadership. Problems can be explained both in terms of the formal and informal institutional setting of the democratic transition, and in terms of socio-economic structures. The paper further concludes that most opposition parties lack grassroots base, because all political parties started from

above and mostly in urban centers and have offices in urban centres and have done very little to reach the grassroots especially in the rural areas where about 87% of the population live. Tanzania is yet another example that shows that quick fixes of instituting formal democratic structures upon an informal, undemocratic culture of neo-patrimonialism will not be sustainable, and that democratic consolidation in the long run depends upon a combination of economic and institutional development. In light of the conclusions made this paper recommends the following:

- i) Opposition parties should stop blaming outside forces; they should instead put more efforts to alleviate their internal weaknesses as their problems are mainly internal. A large part of the parties' time and energies are devoted to internal power struggles, quite naturally for newly started parties in newly introduced multiparty context. Not the least the struggle over who should be chairman and/or presidential candidate, as demonstrated by, e.g., the struggles within NCCR-Mageuizi, CUF, Chadema and TLP. But also struggles and rivalry with other parties in the opposition.
- ii) Opposition parties should observe principles of democracy. It is recommended here that introducing 'term limit' on party's leadership would do much favour to the progress of the respective parties; while CCM do change its leaders at least every 10 years, opposition parties stick with the same individuals who fail them day in day out. You cannot rely on old solutions to solve new problems. Term limits give a party the chance to grow through leadership development. Different members have different ideas on how to bring the party forward. If Real Madrid sticks with same manager they had 10 years ago, they would have not reached 10 European championships by now, they would have even been flattened by 'Tanzania's Simba Sports Club'. Democracy is mainly about paying attention even to words you do not like and act on them.
- iii) Opposition parties should find proper way to reach the 'grassroots'. There is no short of winning elections rather than reaching the people, they need to stick to numbers; when it is said that more than 75% live in rural areas it means voters are in rural areas. Even if you win all constituencies in Dar es-salaam you will never win the general election; you must reach the people and the people are in rural areas.
- iv) All opposition parties should have comprehensive and realistic political programmes and policies if they want to win elections. Ad hoc projects or quick fixes like 'm4c' will not work. Today you say no to a corrupt leader tomorrow you say yes, no one will understand. Tanzanians cannot be fooled they are well-informed and their views must be respected by politicians. The lack of comprehensive policy alternatives to CCM is a critique shared by media, CSO, key informants and voters. Most people share opinion that the opposition in Tanzania does not present alternative policies. Opposition leaders ought to starting

working on this the earlier the better for them.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

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